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assachusetts Commissioner of Banks Steven 
Antonakes convened a mortgage summit in 
November 2006 in response to rising fore-
closures across the state and the nation, 
increasing evidence of mortgage fraud, and 
other developments in the mortgage market. 
The event brought together a wide range 
of stakeholders including representatives 
from government agencies and mortgage 
trade associations as well as community and 
consumer advocates. Attendees, including 
representatives of the Federal Reserve Bank 
of Boston, had the opportunity to share 
perspectives and to propose action steps. 
Immediately following the summit, the 
Massachusetts Division of Banks—the state 
agency responsible for overseeing mort-
gage lending—facilitated the establishment 
of two working groups to develop speciﬁ  c 
recommendations. One group looked at 
rules and enforcement; the second focused 
on consumer education and foreclosure 
assistance. In April 2007, the two working 
groups issued a ﬁ  nal  report,  Report of the 
Mortgage Summit Working Groups: Recom-
mended Solutions to Prevent Foreclosures and 
to Ensure Massachusetts Consumers Maintain 
the Dream of Homeownership.
 The Massachusetts Mortgage Summit 
and its working groups are an example of 
one state’s response to the problem of rising 
foreclosures. The efforts helped organize a 
broad range of stakeholders, brought partici-
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pants up to speed on the newest information related 
to foreclosures, and produced a comprehensive list 
of recommendations. The convening can be consid-
ered a ﬁ  rst step, and many Summit participants are 
actively working to implement the strategies laid out 
in the recommendations. 
This article is a description of the problems 
in the Massachusetts mortgage market and the 
proposed solutions. For those who may be looking to 
promote a similar partnership, it provides a descrip-
tion of the collaborative process used in the Mortgage 
Summit and working groups. The recommendations 
presented illustrate a number of possible remedies to 
limit foreclosures and their impact on consumers and 
communities. We begin by providing some back-
ground on the foreclosure problem in Massachusetts. 
Next, we describe the process of collaboration among 
stakeholders participating in the Mortgage Summit 
working groups. Finally, we present the major 
recommendations of the working groups. Sidebars 
throughout the article identify where working group 
recommendations have since been implemented. 
Background 
In Massachusetts, problems with residential 
mortgages became obvious when housing price 
increases began to cool in 2006. Many borrowers had 
anticipated a continued rapid appreciation in residen-
tial real estate values but the market began to slow. 
For homeowners who were having trouble making 
their mortgage payments, the traditional remedies of 
selling their home or reﬁ  nancing their loan offered 
no solution if the house was now worth less than the 
loan. When payments could not be made, foreclo-
sures began to occur.  
The multidimensional nature of the foreclosure 
problem posed a challenge to organizing a coordinated 
response. There was growing evidence that mortgage 
fraud and aggressive underwriting were exacerbating 
the situation. In addition, the mortgage market itself 
was now quite complex, reﬂ  ecting changes including 
growth in lending by entities other than banks and 
thrifts, the increasing importance of brokers, and the 
expansion of the securitization process. Different 
types of mortgage lenders are subject to different sets 
of laws and regulated by different agencies. Deposi-
tory institutions (such as banks and credit unions), 
their holding companies, and their subsidiaries are 
regulated by federal ﬁ  nancial regulatory agencies.1  
Other entities making mortgages in Massachusetts, 
such as mortgage lenders and mortgage brokers, are 
regulated by the Division of Banks.
Collaboration 
The Division of Banks believed that collaboration 
by a wide range of stakeholders would be the most 
effective means of addressing the complex problems 
surrounding the rise in foreclosures. Increasing their 
own regulatory enforcements would reduce fraud, 
but sweeping changes would require much broader 
support and a broader range of actors. As such, under 
the leadership of the Commissioner of Banks, the 
Division of Banks decided to convene the Mortgage 
Summit and facilitate the working groups. 
Supportive Setting
Below are some of the factors that contributed to 
the fruitful collaborations of the working groups:
1. Strong leadership– The Mortgage Summit 
and working groups were initiated and facili-
tated by the Division of Banks, which has 
both strong credibility and convening powers. 
2.  Supportive setting– While initiated by the 
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the support of Governor Deval Patrick and 
his administration. Attorney General Martha 
Coakley and Boston Mayor Thomas Menino 
were also proponents. At the time, the City of 
Boston had already begun implementing its own 
emergency foreclosure prevention program.2
3.  Members with diverse interests and resources– 
The Division of Banks welcomed a wide 
range of business, government, and not-
for-proﬁ   t organizations to participate in the 
working groups. Mortgage Summit attendees 
and working group members represented 15 
different banks and credit unions, 14 community 
and consumer advocacy groups, 5 trade associa-
tions, and numerous state and federal agencies. 
4.  Kick-off meeting– The Division of Banks used 
the November 2006 Mortgage Summit to create 
momentum that was then leveraged in a series of 
quickly scheduled working group meetings. 
Many times, members of the working groups 
had conﬂ  icting opinions over proposed recommen-
dations. Most splits centered on a few core points.   
There were often strong reactions to recommenda-
tions that could unreasonably restrict access to credit 
or harm businesses making sound and fair lending 
decisions.  After discussion and probing, however, 
committee members worked to ﬁ  nd shared tenets, 
such as “too much access to credit has had negative 
effects” and “some degree of regulation is necessary.” 
Often groups continued to disagree on the appro-
priate levels of regulation necessary for a fair balance.   
Groups also frequently disagreed about how general 
or speciﬁ  c a regulation should be, but were able to 
deﬁ  ne that regulations should be “speciﬁ  c enough 
to be enforceable, but broad enough to be effective.” 
Ultimately, participants agreed on a statement that 
expresses the overall theme of their discussions:
“As an overarching theme of the working groups, it 
was agreed that it should be a fundamental goal of all 
parties in a mortgage transaction that borrowers only 
obtain loans they can reasonably be expected to repay 
based on all information available at the time the loan 
is made and that all borrowers understand the terms of 
the loan.”
After receiving the working groups’ recommen-
dations, staff from the Division of Banks drafted and 
published the Report of the Mortgage Summit Working 
Groups, and publicized it widely to state government, 
businesses, and the public. The report contains the 
recommendations that received the strongest support 
in the working groups, and it describes a number of 
issues that were debated without resolution. Major 
recommendations that received signiﬁ  cant support 
in the working groups are described below.
The Working Groups’ 
Recommendations
The two working groups focused their discussions 
on recommendations that could be implemented 
quickly, given that foreclosure rates were rising 
rapidly. While participants were frustrated with the 
lack of remedies available to consumers with immi-
nent foreclosures, most agreed that it was easier to 
stop bad loans from being made than to try to ﬁ  x 
them after the fact. 
At the start of their discussions, the working 
groups decided to develop recommendations for 
seven issue areas: 
1.  Barriers to entry 
2.  Data and research
3.  The foreclosure process
4. Legislative  issues
5.  Products and practices
6.  Education and counseling, and
7.  Foreclosure intervention products 
      and services. 
Working group members divided themselves 
into smaller subgroups to develop recommendations 
for each issue area and then brought their proposals 
back to the larger working groups for discussion 
and debate. Where possible, the working groups 
identiﬁ  ed the speciﬁ  c entities that should enact the 
recommendations. However, the report explains 
that many of the recommendations would require 
concerted efforts by regulators, law enforcement 
ofﬁ  cials,  ﬁ   nancial institutions, regulated entities, 
community and not-for-proﬁ   t groups, as well as 
consumers themselves. The major recommendations 
of the working groups– those that would have the 
largest repercussions– are described below.
Make mortgage fraud a crime and increase 
the ability to prosecute.
The working groups recommend the criminaliza-
tion of mortgage fraud with the associated penalties 
of imprisonment and sizable ﬁ  nes. Mortgage fraud 
is one of the fastest growing white collar crimes and 
can impact borrowers, communities, the lending 
industry, and the wider economy. Currently, persons 4 Community  Developments
committing mortgage fraud face civil penalties for 
unfair or deceptive acts and can lose their business 
license. The working groups want mortgage fraud to 
become a criminal offense and recommend that the 
penalty for the crime be up to 10 years’ imprison-
ment and/or a $50,000 ﬁ  ne. In cases where multiple 
cases of fraud are committed, the recommendation 
is imprisonment for up to 20 years and ﬁ  nes of up 
to $500,000.
The working groups also 
recommend clariﬁ  cation  of  the 
actions that constitute mort-
gage fraud. They recommend 
that any purposeful misrepre-
sentation of facts related to the 
mortgage process be speciﬁ  cally 
designated as mortgage fraud − 
including exaggerating property 
appraisals, inﬂ  ating  borrower 
income, or lying about the terms 
of a mortgage. They add that 
any law should apply to any 
party committing fraud, including mortgage lenders, 
mortgage brokers, appraisers, and the mortgage 
applicants. 
The criminalization of mortgage fraud requires 
legislative action, although, in Massachusetts, emer-
gency regulations can be passed by the Ofﬁ  ce of the 
Attorney General. If mortgage fraud becomes a crim-
inal offense, the district attorneys and the Attorney 
General would have the authority to investigate and 
prosecute mortgage fraud cases.
Increase mortgage licensing requirements.
In their deliberations, the working groups 
participants expressed concern that individ-
uals caught acting fraudulently need only move 
to a new state to pick up their practice again. 
As such, the working groups recommend several 
remedies to deal with “rogue” brokers and lenders. 
First, the working groups voice support for Massa-
chusetts’ participation in the development of a 
national mortgage licensing system coordinated 
by the Conference of State Bank Supervisors. The 
system would track individuals across state lines and 
identify any public enforcement action taken against a 
broker or lender. Second, the working groups recom-
mend expanding licensing requirements to include 
all mortgage originators. Currently, in Massachu-
setts, only entities operating as a mortgage broker or 
mortgage lender are required to be licensed. There is 
no licensing requirement for individual loan origina-
tors working for a mortgage lender or broker or for 
staff at federally regulated institutions. Licensing of 
all mortgage originators is currently required in over 
20 other states. 
Third, the working groups deem current capital-
ization and net worth requirements to be inadequate 
and recommend stricter requirements for licensing. 
For mortgage lenders, the current requirement is 
$100,000 minimum net worth. But up to $75,000 of 
this can be substituted by a surety bond so, in effect, 
the minimum net worth requirement is $25,000. For 
mortgage brokers, licensing requires only a positive 
adjusted net worth. The call to increase net worth 
requirements is intended to ensure that mortgage 
lenders and mortgage brokers have a signiﬁ  cant 
ﬁ   nancial stake in their own companies. Increased 
bonding or surety requirements would not only 
increase the ﬁ  nancial stake of companies, but would 
also potentially make more funds available to provide 
restitution to consumers who have been defrauded. In 
addition, the working groups unanimously support 
that licensing require a minimum industry experi-
ence of 5 years for mortgage lenders and 3 years for 
mortgage brokers.
Increase revenues to build capacity 
at the Division of Banks.
The working groups recommend that the 
Division of Banks raise additional resources for its 
enforcement role by increasing the fees charged to 
mortgage lenders and mortgage brokers. These fees 
Update: 
On May 13, 2007, the Division of Banks issued proposed 
revisions to regulations on minimum experience require-
ments for licensing of mortgage lenders and mortgage 
brokers. The proposed revisions require 5 years’ experi-
ence for the licensing of a mortgage lender and 3 years’ 
for a mortgage broker.
On June 15, 2007, the Division of Banks issued proposed 
amendments to regulations on the licensing of mortgage 
lenders and mortgage brokers. The proposed amend-
ments include a minimum net worth of $200,000 and 
a surety bond of at least $100,000 for mortgage lenders; 
for mortgage brokers, they recommend a net worth 
minimum of $25,000 and a surety bond of $75,000. 
Update: 
On June 11, 2007, Governor 
Deval Patrick ﬁ   led legislation to 
criminalize mortgage fraud. 
ties can include imprisonment for 
up to 5 years and ﬁ  nes of up to 
$100,000. For cases of repeated 
fraud, punishment can include 
imprisonment for up to 15 years 
and ﬁ  nes of up to $500,000. 
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have not changed since 1992, when licensing was 
implemented. At that time, the Division of Banks was 
responsible for licensing about 150 mortgage lenders 
and mortgage brokers. Currently, they license over 
2,000. The working groups also believe that further 
funding increases are needed if the scope of respon-
sibilities of the Division of Banks expands.  Should 
any new regulations be passed, each would require 
some form of associated funding for enforcement.
Adopt federal guidance on certain mortgage 
loan products.
In October 2006, federal regulators issued guid-
ance on nontraditional mortgage products, which 
include loans that do not fully amortize, such as 
interest-only loans and payment option ARMs. In 
January 2007, the Division of Banks adopted parallel 
guidance that could be applied to lenders that are not 
federally regulated. Federal regulators are currently 
developing guidance on hybrid ARM products, 
including 2/28 and 3/27 loans. The working groups 
recommend that once federal agencies have ﬁ  nal-
ized the guidance, the Division of Banks again adopt 
parallel guidance that can be applied to licensees. 
Change foreclosure laws.
The working groups also recommend changing 
laws to improve the rights of consumers in the 
foreclosure process. They recommend that lenders or 
their agents be required to submit a pre-foreclosure 
notiﬁ  cation to both homeowners and the Division 
of Banks at least 90 days before ﬁ  ling a petition to 
foreclose. The recommended notiﬁ  cation  would 
include information about a wide range of parties 
involved in the mortgage, including the current 
mortgage holder and servicer, and the original lender 
and broker. It would also provide contact information 
for the lender or lender’s agent so that consumers 
could attempt to cure the default or pursue a 
workout of the terms of the mortgage. If a home is 
sold at auction, the borrowers must be provided a full 
accounting of the sale, including information about 
money owed to them.
There was unanimous support among partici-
pants for giving consumers 
the right to cure a default- or 
catch up on late payments. 
In Massachusetts, a lender 
can foreclose on a home 
where the mortgage is in 
default even if the borrower 
is able to catch up on late 
payments. In addition, the 
working groups recommend 
that lenders not be allowed 
to accrue unreasonable fees 
against the borrower after the 
lender ﬁ   les the pre-foreclo-
sure notiﬁ  cation.
Create a database to 
track foreclosures at the 
Division of Banks.
The working groups 
participants agreed that lack 
of data about foreclosures 
is a signiﬁ  cant problem. To 
address this, they recommend 
that the Division of Banks 
develop a database to track 
the information contained on 
each pre-foreclosure notiﬁ  ca-
tion and foreclosure petition. 
The Division could use this 
information to analyze fore-
closure trends in particular 
neighborhoods or communi-
ties, as well as to identify any 
mortgage lenders, brokers, or 
servicers who have unusually 
high incidences of foreclo-
sures tied to their loans. 
Limit foreclosure 
rescue schemes.
Massachusetts has seen a signiﬁ  cant increase in 
two types of foreclosure rescue schemes.  In the ﬁ  rst 
scheme, “consultants” charge homeowners a signiﬁ  -
cant fee to negotiate on their behalf with lenders to 
avoid foreclosure. Fraudulent consultants do little or 
no work on the foreclosure, often leaving the home-
owner without enough time to pursue a legitimate 
workout. In the second scheme, homeowners are 
told that they can stay in their home by selling it 
to the “rescuer” who will rent the property back to 
Update: 
On June 11, 2007, Governor Deval Patrick ﬁ  led legislation that 
would enable the Division of Banks to access greater funding 
for enforcement.
Update: 
On June 11, 2007, Governor Deval Patrick 
ﬁ  led  legislation  requiring  pre-foreclosure 
notiﬁ   cation to homeowners and the 
Division of Banks, and post-foreclosure 
accounting of costs and proceeds of the 
home sale.
On June 11, 2007, Governor Deval Patrick 
ﬁ  led legislation requiring that the name 
and license number of the originating 
mortgage lender and mortgage broker be 
recorded on all mortgages when ﬁ  led with 
a registry of deeds. The legislation also 
requires that the Division of Banks receive 
copies of all pre-foreclosure notiﬁ  cations 
and post-foreclosure accounts of sale, 
which will be entered and maintained in a 
foreclosure database.6 Community  Developments
them. Often, rents are far higher than the original 
mortgage payments, and in some cases consumers 
do not realize that they have given up the ownership 
rights of their property to someone else. 
The working groups targeted these types of 
schemes by proposing legislation to limit the actions 
of consultants and property purchasers. Speciﬁ  -
cally, they recommend that transactions involving 
consultants be required to be in writing and that 
payment not be required until all services have been 
performed. For arrangements involving property 
purchasers, they recommend that the written contract 
be explicit about the fact that the consumer is selling 
their home and contain all terms of the sale. Prop-
erty purchasers would also have to ascertain with a 
reasonable amount of conﬁ  dence that the consumer 
can cover rent payments and can buy the home back 
in the future. For either type of foreclosure rescue 
program, the working groups recommend that the 
consumer have a 5-day grace period within which to 
cancel the contract. 
Raise consumer awareness 
and increase support.
As the working groups placed a strong emphasis 
on helping consumers avoid bad loans, they devel-
oped numerous recommendations about how best to 
increase consumer awareness about foreclosures and 
how to strengthen the impact of existing ﬁ  nancial 
education resources. The working groups strongly 
supported both statewide and grassroots approaches 
to building consumer awareness campaigns and 
informing communities about the home ownership 
resources and local support networks available to 
them. They recommend that resources be focused 
on communities most affected by foreclosures and 
that awareness and education materials be written in 
the languages spoken in the local areas. The working 
groups’ recommendations also stress the importance 
of making homeowner counseling by trained not-
for-proﬁ  t organizations available to local residents 
and encourage community-based not-for-proﬁ  t 
organizations to hold workshops that focus on the 
risks of unsuitable mortgages. 
The working groups have several recommenda-
tions speciﬁ   cally for the state government related 
to consumer education. They suggest that the state 
create a home preservation fund that would be used 
to provide grants and loans to homeowners who 
are victims of mortgage fraud or predatory lending. 
The fund would also be used to support the work of 
not-for-proﬁ  t agencies doing outreach, counseling, 
and reﬁ  nance assistance. In addition, they suggest 
that the state should increase its own capacity for 
ﬁ  nancial education and consumer support. Speciﬁ  -
cally, it should develop a strong ﬁ  nancial education 
website, create a statewide directory of foreclosure 
counselors, and enhance the Division of Banks’ 
mortgage hotline service.
Create foreclosure intervention products.
The working groups recommend the creation 
of specialized mortgage “rescue” products to help 
homeowners reﬁ   nance out of unsustainable loans. 
There was a strong desire among the participants 
to keep homeowners in their homes because of the 
potentially destabilizing effect that a high number 
of foreclosures can have on a particular community. 
The foreclosure intervention mortgage would need 
to be designed for consumers that do not qualify 
for standard products because of poor credit, too-
high loan-to-value ratios, or their inability to pay 
for closing costs. The working groups suggest that 
government sponsored enterprises such as the Federal 
Home Loan Banks provide credit enhancements and 
funding for these intervention products. Finally, the 
working groups emphasize the need for lenders that 
originated a high numbers of the loans experiencing 
difﬁ  culty to help create these intervention products.
Conclusion
Many parties are moving to implement 
the working groups’ recommendations. Less than 
eight months after the initial Mortgage Summit, 
Governor Deval Patrick, Attorney General Martha 
Coakley, and the Division of Banks have all moved 
to enact various recommendations made by the 
working groups. Lenders and industry groups 
have formally endorsed many of the recommenda-
tions. And new collaborations have sprung out of 
the working groups’ recommendations, such as a 
working group to develop a foreclosure intervention 
mortgage product.  
Update: 
On June 1, 2007, Attorney General Martha Coakley announced emer-
gency regulations prohibiting unfair and deceptive foreclosure rescue 
schemes. Distressed property transfers are allowed only if they are 
not-for-proﬁ  t, such as between family members or as arranged by a 
not-for-proﬁ  t community or housing organization.Federal Reserve Bank of Boston  7
The strength of the Mortgage Summit and its 
working groups emerged from the Division of Banks’ 
ability to pull together the participation of over 75 
people representing nearly 50 organizations and to 
get these participants to agree on executable recom-
mendations. It helped that the participants were 
drawn from groups committed to reducing foreclo-
sures and limiting their impact on Massachusetts 
homeowners and communities.  The collaborative 
process that ensued enhanced the depth, breadth, 
and creativity of thinking that went into develop-
ment of the recommendations, and the support 
of such a wide range of stakeholders has helped 
implementation progress rapidly. It is hoped that 
some of the lessons learned in Massachusetts will 
prove helpful to other communities building collab-
orations to address foreclosure problems in their 
local areas.
Julia Reade is a senior research associate at the Federal Reserve
Bank of Boston.
Resources
Division of Banks Report of the Mortgage Summit Working Groups
http://www.mass.gov/dob
Governor Deval Patrick’s Proposed Mortgage Fraud Legislation
http://www.mass.gov
Foreclosure Data Analysis for New England
http://www.bos.frb.org/commdev/foreclosures
Endnotes
  1 Federal regulators consist of the Federal Reserve, Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation, National Credit Union 
Administration, Ofﬁ  ce of the Comptroller of the Currency, and Ofﬁ  ce 
of Thrift Supervision.
  
2 In October 2006, Boston Mayor Thomas Menino announced 
expansion of the city’s foreclosure prevention program. New 
initiatives included a reﬁ  nancing consortium consisting of “First 
Choice Lenders” that would try to help homeowners reﬁ  nance into 
a more secure mortgage and a $500,000 Boston Homeownership 
Preservation Fund to support foreclosure-prevention counseling 
and outreach.